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visual search experiments, which have specifically shown that it is 
difficult to find conjunction targets (e.g., a green X) in a clutter of 
non-targets sharing the defining target features (e.g., red X’s and 
green O’s), and that single features may be miscombined to form 
illusory conjunctions (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Treisman, 1996; 
Wolfe and Cave, 1999). Of course, this problem especially pertains 
to the encoding of multi-feature objects, such as complex artificial 
stimuli or natural images. Similar integration problems arise in 
visual grouping and figure–ground segmentation, where feature 
integration occurs across space (Roelfsema, 2006), or in object con-
stancy, where integration occurs across time (Turnbull et al., 1997).
The exact neural foundations of binding are still debated 
(Schmidt, 2009). The classical view of the visual system as a step-
wise processing hierarchy describes input–output relations between 
visual areas, but basically ignores temporal aspects, such as the 
speed of information transfer from one area to the next, the role of 
re-entrant information, and the role of recurrent processing loops 
(for reviews, see Bullier, 2004; Gilbert and Sigman, 2007). In recent 
years, the temporal dynamics of processing have received much 
more attention, which led to a fundamentally revised view of the 
Complex stimuli, binding, and the fast feedforward 
sweep
Much has been learned in the last decades about the flow of infor-
mation within a hierarchy of visual areas. A classical view of visual 
perception is that early visual areas encode local object features 
that are passed on to higher-level areas for more integrated pro-
cessing of color, shape, or motion (Hubel and Livingstone, 1987; 
Livingstone and Hubel, 1987; see Sincich and Horton, 2005, for 
an update). Beyond that level, more and more intricate aspects 
of visual objects are extracted, until areas in the inferotemporal 
cortex are reached that encode complex objects or faces (Tanaka, 
1996; Quiroga et al., 2005), either by specialized single cells or by 
sparse coding (Barlow, 1972; DeCharms and Zador, 2000). Finally, 
entire scenes are processed where objects have to be recognized in 
the context of other objects (Bar and Aminoff, 2003; Bar, 2004).
This system faces a set of complicated tasks. One of the most 
basic ones is feature binding, the challenge to assign separately 
encoded features to the appropriate objects without creating false 
combinations (Treisman, 1996; Wolfe and Cave, 1999). Classical 
evidence that the visual system faces a binding problem comes from 
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doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00169visual system. Most importantly, several authors have stressed a 
distinction between two radically different types of visual process-
ing: a rapid feedforward process where visual activation proceeds 
in bottom-up direction through the visual system, and a slower, 
recurrent process developing in the immediate wake of this “fast 
feedforward sweep” (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; also see Bullier, 
2001; VanRullen and Thorpe, 2002). Many solutions that have been 
proposed for the binding problem involve the slower, recurrent 
type of processing, e.g., binding by spike synchrony (Gray and 
Singer, 1989; Gray, 1999; but see Shadlen and Movshon, 1999), or 
by visual attention operating on spatial and feature maps (Treisman, 
1996; Roelfsema, 2006). Most of these must be considered time-
consuming, requiring the integration of information over separate 
brain areas and several feedback cycles. Faster binding would be 
achieved by feedforward cascades involving specialized cells (or 
sparsely coded cell assemblies) directly coding for feature combina-
tions (DeCharms and Zador, 2000; VanRullen, 2009). Consistent 
with that idea, evidence from the rapid discrimination of natural 
images suggests that elaborate categorization of objects is possible 
during the first feedforward sweep of visual processing (Thorpe 
et al., 1996; VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001; Kirchner and Thorpe, 
2006), a finding which is also in accord with neuronal network 
modeling (VanRullen et al., 1998, 2001; Serre et al., 2007).
The distinction between feedforward and recurrent processing 
is crucial for many aspects of mid-level vision, particularly figure–
ground segmentation, which is a key step in human vision. Lamme 
et al. (1999; see also Roelfsema et al., 2002; Supèr and Lamme, 2007; 
Scholte et al., 2008; Supèr et al., 2010) employed figure–ground 
displays consisting of textures of oriented line elements, showing 
that neurons in primary visual cortex first respond selectively to 
local line orientations in their receptive field. After about 100 ms, 
however, responses are selectively enhanced when the receptive 
field lies on a figure as opposed to the background, and responses 
even become independent of the orientation of local line elements. 
In other words, those cells change from local feature detectors to 
figure–ground detectors during the course of stimulation. This 
groundbreaking discovery suggests that the response properties 
of the cells are radically changed by re-entrant signals from down-
stream visual areas, even while the cells are already responding to 
the stimulus. These findings also highlight the need to understand 
the time course of processing in feedforward as opposed to recur-
rent networks, recognizing that any area might serve different func-
tions at different points in time.
response priming independent of visual awareness
One of the major tenets of this paper is that the role of feedfor-
ward processing of complex stimulus displays can be assessed by 
tracing the time courses of speeded motor responses. A paradigm 
especially suited to examine rapid response activation by visual 
stimuli is response priming (Klotz and Wolff, 1995; Klotz and 
Neumann, 1999). In response priming, participants perform a 
speeded response to a target stimulus that is preceded by a prime 
stimulus triggering either the same response as the target (consist-
ent prime) or the opposite response (inconsistent prime). In typical 
experiments, the targets serves the additional purpose of reduc-
ing the visibility of the prime by backward masking (Breitmeyer 
and Ög ˇmen, 2006). Nevertheless, consistent primes will speed up 
responses to the target while inconsistent primes will slow down 
responses, and this priming effect increases with increasing time 
interval between prime onset and target onset (stimulus-onset 
asynchrony, SOA; Vorberg et al., 2003).
Generally, response priming effects occur because the prime 
activates the response assigned to it, inducing a motor conflict 
if prime and target are inconsistent. This has first been dem-
onstrated in the time course of lateralized readiness potentials 
(LRPs), which represent an electroencephalographic measure of 
selective preparation of right- or left-hand responses. Typically, 
these potentials start out time-locked to the prime, first develop 
in the direction specified by the prime, and only later pro-
ceed in the direction specified by the actual target (Eimer and 
Schlaghecken, 1998; Leuthold and Kopp, 1998; Verleger et al., 
2004; Klotz et al., 2007; Vath and Schmidt, 2007). An alternative 
way to trace the prime’s motor impact over time is the kinematic 
analysis of primed pointing responses (Schmidt, 2002; Brenner 
and Smeets, 2004; Song and Nakayama, 2009). These experi-
ments show that inconsistent primes are able to mislead point-
ing movements into the wrong direction, such that the initial 
finger movement is time-locked to the prime, first proceeds in 
the direction specified by the prime, and only then proceeds in 
target direction (Schmidt, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2006). These 
effects clearly show that the priming effect increases with prime–
target SOA because the prime has progressively more time to 
direct the response into the correct or incorrect direction, even 
to the point where an inconsistent prime provokes a full-fledged 
response error (see Vorberg et al., 2003, for a mathematical model 
of these response activation processes). Consequently, response 
errors almost exclusively occur in inconsistent trials, and there 
increase in frequency with increasing SOA.
Strikingly, response priming effects are independent of visual 
awareness of the prime: the time course of priming is invariant no 
matter whether the prime can be identified perfectly or not at all, 
and no matter whether prime identification performance increases 
or decreases with SOA
1, which implies that priming and awareness 
can actually change in opposite directions (Vorberg et al., 2003; 
see also Mattler, 2003; Albrecht et al., 2010). Under mild meas-
urement assumptions, such double dissociations between priming 
and awareness indicate that visual awareness is based on process-
ing mechanisms distinct from those leading to response priming 
(Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006)2. Specifically, Lamme and Roelfsema 
1This holds true as long as visual awareness of the prime is manipulated only by 
changing the degree of visual masking while leaving the prime stimulus physically 
intact. Altering the prime stimulus itself of course alters the priming effect (see 
Schmidt et al., in revision, for further discussion of “Dos and Don’ts in Response 
Priming Research”).
2As analyzed in detail by Schmidt and Vorberg (2006), a double dissociation occurs 
if an experimental manipulation leads to opposite effects in two measures, for in-
stance, a direct measure of visual awareness (e.g., prime identification   performance) 
and an indirect measure of prime processing per se (e.g., a priming effect). Let Ii(ci, 
ui) and Di(ci, ui) be indirect and direct measures in experimental condition i, such 
that both are functions of conscious (c) as well as unconscious (u) sources of visual 
information. A double dissociation is observed when for two experimental con-
ditions i and j, Ii(ci, ui) > Ij(cj, uj) while Di(ci, ui) < Dj(cj, uj), or vice versa. Schmidt 
and Vorberg (2006) show that a double dissociation implies non-zero uncon-
scious information (u > 0) in at least one experimental condition. Measurement 
assumptions required for this conclusion are much weaker than those required for 
demonstrating zero sensitivity in the direct task.
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response control. Priming effects, as well as error rates in inconsist-
ent trials, increase with prime–target SOA because the prime has 
more time to drive the response on its own when the target is further 
delayed. The feedforward properties of such a system would show 
in the time course of the motor response as follows (rapid-chase 
criteria, Schmidt et al., 2006):
(1) prime rather than target signals should determine the onset 
and initial direction of the response (initiation criterion);
(2) target signals should be able to influence the response before 
it is completed (takeover criterion);
(3) movement kinematics should initially depend on prime cha-
racteristics only and be independent of all target characteri-
stics (independence criterion)3.
Note that the initiation and independence criteria describe 
exclusive initial response control by the prime, while the   takeover 
criterion is merely needed to make sure that the target is not 
altogether ignored. A stimulus–response system meeting these 
functional criteria would be behaviorally equivalent to a simple 
feedforward system. Note that the notion of a rapid-chase is milder 
than that of a feedforward sweep: whereas the feedforward sweep 
entails the possibility of rapid chases but excludes the possibility 
of local recurrent activity, the rapid-chase account allows for local 
recurrence as long as sequential signals still lead to strictly sequen-
tial motor output. Further note that rapid-chase processing implies 
that the first sweep must be independent of the second sweep, but 
not vice versa. Therefore, the criteria demand that initial processing 
be controlled exclusively by the prime, but not that later processing 
be controlled exclusively by the target.
In the following sections, we review our recent research on response 
priming by complex visual stimuli. We start by showing that the clas-
sification of natural images (into animal vs. non-animal pictures) sat-
isfies the rapid-chase criteria, establishing response priming by such 
images as a rapid-chase process (Schmidt and Schmidt, 2009). We 
then show how the deployment of visual attention just in time before 
onset of the prime can boost visuomotor priming, both for spatial 
and feature-based attention (Schmidt and Seydell, 2008; Schmidt 
and Schmidt, 2010), in a way consistent with enhanced   bottom-up 
processing of incoming stimuli. Interestingly, similar boosting occurs 
on a much longer time-scale in individuals with specific phobias 
(e.g., for spiders or snakes) when processing phobic stimuli, prob-
ably as a result of life-long perceptual learning (Haberkamp et al., in 
preparation). Finally, we investigate priming effects by dark vs. bright 
primes under illumination and transparency illusions that alter the 
perceived brightness of the primes. Surprisingly, priming effects in 
speeded keypress responses can systematically contradict subjective 
brightness judgments, such that one prime appears brighter than 
the other but activates motor responses as if it was darker (Schmidt 
et al., 2010; Weber and Schmidt, in preparation). We will argue that 
response priming is dominated by the output of the first feedforward 
pass of visual signals through the visuomotor system, and that this 
(2000) propose that conscious perception is possible only with 
recurrent processing of the stimulus, whereas feedforward process-
ing alone is insufficient for generating visual awareness (Lamme 
and Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, 2006; cf. Dehaene and Naccache, 
2001; Dehaene, 2009). In contrast to many other theories of con-
sciousness, Lamme and Roelfsema’s theory is making strong and 
testable predictions. Supporting evidence comes from studies indi-
cating that visual awareness is suppressed if re-entrant loops from 
extrastriate visual areas through primary visual cortex are disrupted 
at critical points in time, for instance, by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001; Ro et al., 2003), or 
by backward masking (DiLollo et al., 2000; Lamme et al., 2002; 
Bacon-Macé et al., 2005; Haynes et al., 2005; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; 
cf. Macknik and Livingstone, 1998; Macknik and Haglund, 1999).
rapid-Chase theory
Lamme and Roelfsema’s (2000) theory can easily explain the 
major findings in response priming: priming could directly reflect 
sequential sweeps of feedforward processing initiated by primes 
and targets, and thus precede the recurrent processes leading to 
visual awareness. However, the notion of a feedforward process-
ing stage in human vision is controversial. Feedback mechanisms 
within and between visual areas can be rapid (Bullier, 2001, 2004; 
Sillito et al., 2006; Roland, 2010), and information might be pro-
cessed at different rates in parallel streams (Merigan and Maunsell, 
1993; Chen et al., 2007), with plenty of opportunity for visual 
signals to cross or overtake each other. Because the feedforward 
sweep is unobservable on a single-cell level, behavioral evidence 
is needed to show that the notion is plausible for human informa-
tion processing.
Indeed, several studies have shown that the early time course 
of primed pointing movements (Schmidt et al., 2006) and LRPs 
(Vath and Schmidt, 2007) depends only on prime but not on tar-
get characteristics, as would be predicted for a simple feedforward 
system processing primes and targets in strict sequence. This is 
most easily seen in the time course of primed pointing movements, 
which can be measured with higher spatial and temporal precision 
than EEG signals. Schmidt et al. (2006) studied primed pointing 
responses to color stimuli, using primes and targets of either high or 
low color saturation as well as different types of targets. The initial 
time courses of the priming effects depended exclusively on color 
saturation of the primes but were independent of target type and 
target onset time. Similarly, Vath and Schmidt (2007) studied key-
press responses with primes and targets that could independently 
be high or low in color saturation. Again, initial priming effects in 
LRPs depended only on prime saturation but were independent 
of target saturation or target onset time. In both studies, only later 
segments of the priming effects were influenced by characteristics 
of the actual target.
For that reason, Schmidt et al. (2006; Vath and Schmidt, 2007) 
proposed a rapid-chase theory of response priming where primes 
and targets elicit feedforward sweeps that traverse the visuomotor 
system in strict sequence, without any temporal overlap. Prime 
and target sweeps are able to directly initiate the motor responses 
assigned to them, with no need for conscious control (the principle 
of direct parameter specification, Neumann, 1990). The prime sig-
nal reaches motor areas first, initiating a response and continuing 
3A corollary of these criteria is that priming effects should be fully present in the 
fastest motor responses, for example, in the fastest deciles of the response time di-
stributions from consistent and inconsistent trials.
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one rectangle were presented as targets (preceded by ellipses 
and rectangles as primes), and participants had to point 
toward the ellipse target. These stimuli should yield unequi-
vocal evidence for rapid-chase processing and approximate 
an upper limit on classification speed against which the ani-
mal–object tasks could be compared.
All tasks yielded large priming effects, with the exception of 
Experiment 1’s large–small task (discussed below). To analyze 
response priming in pointing movements, we looked at the entire 
time course of the primed pointing responses. As observed in 
previous experiments (e.g., Schmidt, 2002; Schmidt et al., 2006), 
responses started at a fixed time following prime onset and ini-
tially went into the direction specified by the primes, suggesting 
that the primes initiated the response instead of the actual targets. 
When primes and targets were consistent, this initial direction was 
correct, and the movement simply proceeded in the correct direc-
tion until the response was completed. However, in inconsistent 
trials, the movement initially detoured into the direction of the 
misleading prime. The longer the SOA, the longer and farther the 
finger traveled toward the misleading prime before the movement 
reversed and finally proceeded in the correct direction, obviously 
because the response was now controlled by the targets. Even in 
the absence of overt detours, inconsistent primes delayed response 
onset, and this delay increased with prime–target SOA. The time 
course of primed pointing responses shows that the first two of the 
rapid-chase criteria are clearly met: it is the primes, not the tar-
gets, that elicit the first response and determine its initial direction 
(initiation criterion), and the targets are able to take over response 
control before the response is finished (takeover criterion).
To evaluate the independence criterion (initial movements 
must be controlled exclusively by the primes and independent of 
all properties of the targets), we examined the time course of prim-
ing effects defined in the spatial domain, i.e., the spatial lag of the 
pointing movements in inconsistent compared to consistent trials 
at corresponding points in time (see Figure 1B for definition). 
Spatial priming functions describe spatial lag as a function of time 
from prime onset.
Priming functions for all four tasks and different SOA condi-
tions are depicted in Figure 1C. It is evident that spatial prim-
ing functions in each task follow an invariant initial time course 
before individual priming functions branch off one after another 
in the order of increasing prime–target SOAs. (Again, the only 
exception is the large–small task of Experiment 1.) This striking 
invariance means that the initial priming effects are exclusively 
determined by the primes and that only later phases of the process 
are affected by the actual targets. The spatial priming functions 
thus satisfy the rapid-chase criteria, establishing response prim-
ing of animal–non-animal classifications in natural images as a 
rapid-chase process.
Our findings also show that the type of image classification task 
is crucial for determining whether the classification can be per-
formed as a rapid-chase process. A case in point is the large–small 
task of Experiment 1, which yielded slow responses, small priming 
effects, and little evidence for rapid-chase processing. It thus seems 
that this task cannot be performed in a single feedforward sweep 
output lacks some characteristic features of more elaborate, recur-
rent processing. This way, visuomotor measures may dissociate from 
several aspects of conscious vision.
rapid-Chase proCessing of natural images
Our visual system is able to categorize images of natural visual 
scenes at remarkable speed (Hegdé, 2008). Evidence stems from 
go–nogo tasks (e.g., Thorpe et al., 1996; VanRullen and Thorpe, 
2002; VanRullen and Koch, 2003) as well as from two-alternative 
forced-choice paradigms (Bacon-Macé et al., 2007). Perhaps the 
most impressive set of data comes from Kirchner and Thorpe (2006), 
whose participants had to decide which of two pictures contained an 
animal by performing a speeded saccade toward the animal picture. 
The authors demonstrated that the rate of correct responses begins 
to exceed the rate of errors at saccade latencies as short as 120 ms, 
indicating extremely fast image classification and response activa-
tion. Based on such findings, several authors have suggested that 
natural scene processing is occurring in the first sweep of feedfor-
ward processing through the visuomotor system (e.g., Thorpe et al., 
1996; VanRullen and Thorpe, 2002; VanRullen and Koch, 2003).
Of course, the sheer rapidity of this system is highly suggestive of 
feedforward processing. But does the system meet the rapid-chase 
criteria? We employed a primed pointing paradigm featuring natu-
ral images, comparing four tasks in two experiments (Schmidt and 
Schmidt, 2009). In each task, two target images (each from one of 
two picture categories, e.g., animals and objects) appeared in diago-
nally opposite quadrants of the display (Figure 1A). Participants 
pointed from the center of the display toward the picture of the 
relevant target category (e.g., the animal). Before the targets, two 
primes appeared at the same positions for 33 ms at prime–target 
SOAs between 33 and 100 ms. Image categories could either be 
presented at the same spatial positions in primes as well as targets 
(consistent trials), or prime categories could be spatially switched 
with respect to target categories (inconsistent trials). Pointing 
responses were recorded by a POLHEMUS FASTRAK® magnetic 
tracking device. Primes in consistent and inconsistent trials were 
expected to initiate responses toward the direction of the correct 
target image or the opposite direction, respectively. We employed 
the following tasks:
(1) In the animal–object task of Experiment 1, image categories 
were animals and non-animals presented as gray-scale pho-
tographs in front of their natural cluttered backgrounds. 
Participants pointed as quickly as possible from the display 
center toward the animal target. This task was designed to 
match the standard conditions in most studies on rapid image 
classification (e.g., Thorpe et al., 1996).
(2) In the large–small task of Experiment 1, exactly the same pic-
tures were presented, but participants had to point toward the 
item that would be larger in real life.
(3) The toy animal–object task of Experiment 2 was identical to 
that of Experiment 1 but used novel stimuli (mainly pictures 
of toy animals and household goods, selected from a database 
by Geusebroek et al., 2005). These appeared at high color and 
luminance contrast against a black background to provide a 
stronger feedforward signal and yield larger priming effects 
than those observed in Experiment 1 with gray-scale images.
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natural image classification is extraordinarily fast, or “ultra-rapid” 
(VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006), at least 
when compared with basic classifications of geometric stimuli, like 
ellipses and rectangles. The important point is that even though the 
different tasks reported here represent a wide range of processing 
speeds, they all meet strict functional criteria for the behavior of a 
rapid-chase system. Meeting those functional criteria is not simply 
and requires more extensive recurrent processing, or even cognitive 
control to overrule a natural tendency to classify the images based 
on an animal–object distinction.
For the remaining tasks, however, rapid-chase processing links 
visuomotor priming to the feedforward processing of images 
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000), thereby supporting conclusions 
from previous studies (e.g., Thorpe et al., 1996; VanRullen and Koch, 
2003; Hung et al., 2005; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006;   Bacon-Macé 
 Figure 1 | Paradigm and results from Schmidt and Schmidt (2009). 
(A) Time course of a trial. Participants’ task is to point to the image containing an 
animal, using a hand-held stylus. The arrow illustrates a correct pointing 
response. (B) Definition of spatial priming effects. Sensor positions in consistent 
and inconsistent trials were projected onto the target–non-target axis and 
subtracted. The resulting measure of priming is negative when the sensor 
position in consistent trials leads the sensor position in inconsistent trials. (C) 
Spatial priming functions. Only correct responses are shown; functions are 
locked to prime onset. Reproduced with permission from Psychonomic 
Society Inc.
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all, and also necessary for allowing a priming effect to develop. We 
studied the impact of endogenous spatial attention (Yantis and 
Serences, 2003) on primed pointing movements by presenting a 
circular configuration of 10 possible targets preceded by 10 primes 
at the same positions (Figure 2, upper panel). Stimulus configura-
tions were such that neighboring stimuli would be alternately red 
and green, and a red target or prime would always lie opposite to a 
green one. Primes were either all consistent with the targets (mean-
ing that at each of the 10 positions, prime and target had the same 
color) or all inconsistent to the targets. Participants responded to 
one pair of opposite targets by pointing to the target of appointed 
color. To know which of the target pairs to respond to, they had 
to process a spatial cue presented just before prime onset, which 
indicated the relevant pair of opposing targets.
a matter of sheer rapidity of processing but of its temporal dynam-
ics (i.e., whether stimulus signals remain separate when traversing 
the visuomotor system in sequence), even for comparatively low 
rates of processing.
response priming enhanCed by visual attention: 
dissoCiations between motor aCtivation, attention, 
and awareness
Rapid-chase theory maintains that primes and targets should not 
be able to trigger attentional modulation of their own feedforward 
processing, which would outpace any such modulatory influence. 
However, visual attention deployed in time before the occurrence 
of the primes should be able to modulate subsequent feedforward 
processing of primes and targets. In a first study (Schmidt and 
Seydell, 2008), our goal was to create a task where visual selective 
 Figure 2 | Paradigm and results from Schmidt and Seydell (2008; 
experiment 2). Upper panel: time course of a trial. Participants point from 
the center of the display to the red one of the two targets indicated by the 
position cue. Middle panel: finger position along the target–non-target axis, 
with positive values indicating the direction of the correct target. Note the 
detours toward the incorrect target in inconsistent trials. Lower panel: 
spatial priming functions for different cuing intervals. Conventions as 
in Figure 1.
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were very similar to the ones by Schmidt and Seydell (2008), with 
spatially directed detours indicating that spatial selection had taken 
place on the basis of feature-based attention. Enhancement of prim-
ing effects was optimal at cuing intervals of 500 ms. With the cave-
ats mentioned above, priming functions were consistent with the 
rapid-chase criteria, even for the shortest SOAs, suggesting that the 
attentional modulation directly affected feedforward processing of 
primes and targets (Figure 3, middle panel). Similar results were 
obtained when the shape and color domains were swapped, i.e., 
when participants processed a color cue telling them to respond to 
the cued color stimulus of appointed shape (Schmidt and Schmidt, 
2010; Experiment 1).
Several recent studies have demonstrated effects of selective 
attention on stimuli that do not reach awareness (e.g., Melcher 
et al., 2005; Kanai et al., 2006; Kentridge et al., 2008; Zhaoping, 2008; 
Shin et al., 2009). Therefore, in addition to priming effects, we also 
measured prime visibility in a task where participants saw the exact 
same stimuli as before but had to point without time pressure to 
the position of the cued prime of appointed color (Schmidt and 
Schmidt, 2010). Figure 3 (lower panel) plots performance in prime 
identification against the maximum amplitude of the spatial prim-
ing functions. Clearly, priming amplitude is strongly modulated 
by both prime–target SOA and cuing interval, even though in all 
conditions, prime identification performance is close to chance 
level. This finding not only indicates that visuomotor priming 
processes are independent of prime visibility, but that the atten-
tional enhancement of prime processing also is. In other words, 
feature-based attention enhanced the processing of stimuli which 
themselves remained invisible to the participants, suggesting that 
different neurophysiological processes are underlying attention and 
awareness (Lamme, 2003, 2005; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).
enhanCed proCessing of phobiC images
The studies described above show that visual attention deployed 
in time before the occurrence of the prime can boost visuomotor 
priming processes. Interestingly, however, a similar enhancement of 
visuomotor processing occurs on a much longer time-scale in par-
ticipants with specific phobias. Current studies suggest that people 
with specific phobias initially display an involuntary attentional bias 
toward threat stimuli (Mogg and Bradley, 2006; Rinck and Becker, 
2006; Fox et al., 2007; for a review see Mathews and MacLeod, 2005). 
Recent studies also reported a subsequent and probably voluntary 
avoidance of those stimuli by phobic individuals (e.g., Rinck and 
Becker, 2006). Both phenomena, the early and involuntary atten-
tional bias toward a threatening stimulus as well as the later inten-
tional avoidance, might contribute to the maintenance of specific 
phobias in patients. However, despite the many studies focusing on 
the spontaneous attentional response to phobic images, no study 
we know of directly addressed the speed with which phobic and 
non-phobic stimuli are processed.
Working from the assumption that the speeded classification 
of images into specific response categories is a feedforward pro-
cess (Thorpe et al., 1996; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006; Schmidt and 
Schmidt, 2009), our goal was to explore whether fear-related images 
give rise to larger response priming effects than neutral images, 
and whether this processing advantage is stronger in   participants 
In this paradigm, selective attention is controlled by the cuing 
interval, i.e., the amount of time available for processing the cue 
before the prime is presented. The idea is that the longer the cuing 
interval, the more time is available for deploying selective atten-
tion to the cued stimulus locations. Primes and targets presented 
at those locations should then have a processing advantage, leading 
to more vigorous visuomotor processing and larger priming effects. 
Note that this design has two peculiarities that make it attractive for 
studying the deployment of visual attention. Firstly, participants are 
forced to spatially select stimuli in order to respond to the correct 
target. This is why we named the design a “selection-for-action” 
paradigm (after Allport, 1989). Secondly, and more importantly, 
any finding of a spatially directed priming effect implies that spatial 
selection must have taken place, because without spatial selection, 
the circular array of primes surrounding the initial finger position 
would not be expected to induce a movement in any particular 
direction.
Figure 2 shows how different cuing intervals affect spatial prim-
ing effects. Pointing trajectories developed in the typical manner 
described above (Figure 2, middle panel). In consistent as well as 
inconsistent trials, response onset was time-locked to the prime 
and first proceeded in the direction specified by the prime, repeat-
edly leading to detours in inconsistent trials. Again, the duration 
and spatial extent of those detours increased with prime–target 
SOA. Spatial priming functions (Figure 2, lower panel) were also 
time-locked to the prime, and their early time course was largely 
invariant except for the shortest SOA. Even though the rapid-chase 
criteria do not strictly apply to this class of experiment because 
the prime–target sequence encounters a system already engaged in 
cue processing and the deployment of attention, the overall time 
courses are similar to those shown in Figure 1, and are reasonably 
consistent with a rapid-chase system.
Most importantly, spatial priming was clearly modulated by the 
cuing interval: all aspects of the motor response were enhanced as 
the cuing interval became longer, including the onset time of the 
spatial priming effect, the peak priming amplitude, and several 
movement velocity parameters. Moreover, priming effects were 
spatially directed as shown by the overt detours in the direction 
of the cued prime pair, which implies that spatial selection must 
have taken place. Together, these findings strongly suggest that 
participants indeed use the cue to deploy selective attention to the 
cued positions, and that the visuomotor feedforward processing 
of primes and targets at those positions is enhanced relative to 
the uncued positions. We found similar results for an experiment 
where attention was summoned involuntarily by valid or invalid 
exogenous cues (Schmidt and Seydell, 2008; Experiment 1). Our 
results are in line with a study by Sumner et al. (2006), who showed 
that response priming can be enhanced by exogenous attention.
Fascinatingly, all aspects of selective attention in the spatial 
domain can be generalized to selection in the domains of color 
and shape features. Schmidt and Schmidt (2010) employed the 
selection-for-action paradigm to study the effects of feature-based 
attention on priming. Instead of using a precue that would directly 
point at the relevant pair of stimulus positions, we employed a shape 
cue that would indicate the shape of the relevant target stimuli 
(Figure 3, upper panel). Participants were then instructed to point 
as quickly as possible from the display center to the cued shape of 
Schmidt et al.  Visual processing in rapid-chase systems
www.frontiersin.org  July 2011  | Volume 2  |  Article 169  |  7participants, snakes for snake-fearful participants) from merely 
aversive ones (spiders and snakes in general) as well as from neutral, 
non-aversive pictures (flowers and mushrooms). Spider-fearful, 
 specifically fearful of those images, compared to non-anxious con-
trol participants (Haberkamp et al., in preparation). We distin-
guished downright phobic pictures (e.g., spiders for spider-fearful 
 Figure 3 | Paradigm and results from Schmidt and Schmidt (2010; 
experiment 2). Upper panel: time course of a trial. Participants point from the 
center of the display to the red one of the two targets indicated by the shape cue 
(here, a square). Middle panel: spatial priming functions for different cuing 
intervals. Conventions as in Figure 1. Lower panel: response accuracy in the 
prime identification task plotted against maximum spatial priming effects in the 
target identification task. Here and in all further figures, error bars denote standard 
errors of the mean with pure intersubject variance removed (Cousineau, 2005).
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from mushroom and flower targets (animal vs. non-animal task) 
or spider and mushroom targets from snake and flower targets 
(spider vs. snake task). By comparing these two tasks, we not only 
can address the processing difference between aversive and neu-
tral images (i.e., the difference between animal and non-animal 
snake-fearful, and non-phobic individuals performed speeded 
keypress responses to target pictures of snakes, spiders, mush-
rooms, and flowers, which were preceded by prime pictures from 
the same image categories (Figure 4A). In each trial, the prime 
was either consistent or inconsistent with the target with respect 
to the required motor response. Participants performed two tasks 
 Figure 4 | Paradigm and results from Haberkamp et al. (in preparation). 
(A) Time course of a trial. Participants classify the target picture by keypress 
according to different tasks. (B) Stimulus–response mappings. Participants 
either had to discriminate spider and snake targets from mushroom and flower 
targets (animal vs. non-animal task) or spider and mushroom targets from snake 
and flower targets (spider vs. snake task). (C) Priming effects in each group 
separated by targets, pooled across tasks. (D) Priming effects for spider-fearful 
individuals in the spider vs. snake task. The left panel shows effects for 
response-consistent and response-inconsistent primes, the right panel shows 
effects for all prime categories.
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recognition process that can be accomplished in a feedforward 
fashion. Extending this view to emotional stimuli, we propose that 
emotionally significant stimuli are not processed faster because 
emotional arousal speeds on-line perceptual processes (Öhman 
et al., 2001), but because emotion promotes perceptual learning 
that speeds processing at later times, e.g., by establishing hard-wired 
binding (VanRullen, 2009).
dissoCiating ConsCious and preConsCious 
brightness proCessing
The subjective perception of lightness and brightness is the final 
outcome of a complex processing system that finally leads to an 
integrated representation of the visual stimuli in conscious vision. 
Typical psychophysical judgments are based on this conscious repre-
sentation; examples include judgments of lightness (the subjectively 
perceived reflectance of a surface) and brightness (the subjectively 
perceived luminance of a surface). An intriguing property of this 
representation is lightness constancy, the ability to perceive invariant 
surface reflectance despite changes in illumination. Lightness con-
stancy demands the extraction of three-dimensional scenic layout 
from the two-dimensional optic array. It requires the correct assess-
ment of complex information about oriented surfaces, light sources, 
light and shadow contours, and transparency. Theories of lightness 
processing agree that this is a multistage process starting from a raw 
material of local image contrasts (Adelson, 1993; Gilchrist et al., 
1999; Li and Gilchrist, 1999; Gilchrist, 2006)4.
Rapid-chase theory suggests that rapid motor measures of per-
ception are based on the first feedforward sweep of image pro-
cessing. If lightness constancy is the final outcome of elaborate 
processing (probably involving binding by widespread recurrent 
processing), is it possible that visuomotor measures of lightness and 
brightness might tap into earlier representations, maybe those still 
devoid of lightness constancy? To address this question, we used 
response priming to compare visuomotor measures of process-
ing with conscious brightness judgments. Our major question was 
whether visual brightness illusions affect response priming effects 
in the same way that they affect conscious vision. Alternatively, 
are there qualitative differences of illusion effects on priming and 
awareness?
We employed brightness illusions (cf. Adelson, 2000) based on 
illumination effects (Schmidt et al., 2010) or transparency effects 
(Weber and Schmidt, in preparation). Stimuli from Schmidt et al. 
(2010) are shown in Figure 5A. In each trial, a folded plane was 
presented that was apparently illuminated from the left or right, 
creating light and shadow zones. Two target patches (one with 
high-luminance, “bright,” and one with low-luminance, “dark”) 
were presented in the mid-segment of the plane, preceded by 
two flanker primes (one bright and one dark) with the same two 
physical luminance values as the targets (Figure 5B). The flank-
ers’ spatial arrangement could be consistent with the targets’ (e.g., 
bright flanker on the same side as the bright target) or inconsistent 
(spatially switched). The twist of the experiment is that flankers 
images), but also the difference between aversive and phobic images 
(e.g., the difference between spider and snake images in spider-
fearful individuals). Using this two-task design, most meaningful 
comparisons can be made within individual participants.
Strong and reliable priming effects were observed in response 
times and error rates for each group and task. In Figure 4C, priming 
effects are shown separately for each target and group, but aver-
aged over the two tasks. The most important effect was a dramatic 
increase in response speed in the spider-fearful group when spi-
ders served as targets. In contrast to that, snake-fearful and control 
participants responded with similar speed to all target categories 
(spiders, snakes, mushrooms, and flowers). This was a surprise 
given our expectation that snake-fearful participants, analogous 
to spider-fearful participants, would respond selectively faster to 
phobic targets.
Beside faster responses to phobic spider targets, we also found 
stronger priming effects from phobic primes, especially in partici-
pants fearful of spiders. Figure 4D shows the results for the spider-
fearful participants in the “spider vs. snake” task, where spider and 
mushroom pictures are mapped to one response, and snake and 
flower pictures to the alternative response. The left panel plots prim-
ing effects separately for different types of primes. Here, the result is 
that priming effects are large for spider and mushroom primes, but 
seem to break down for snake and flower primes. This surprising 
pattern is due to a strong main effect of target type, as shown in 
the right panel where effects are displayed separately for each type 
of prime picture. Clearly, spider-fearful individuals always respond 
rapidly whenever a spider appears as a target, even if it is inconsistent 
to the prime. This behavior augments priming effects when primes 
are response-consistent with the spider (i.e., when primes are spi-
ders or mushrooms), but reduces priming effects when primes are 
response-inconsistent with the spider (i.e., when primes are snakes 
or flowers), thus explaining the data pattern in the left panel. Again, 
this response pattern does not occur in snake-fearful or control 
participants. One reason for these qualitative difference between 
the two phobias might be that Germans are much more likely to 
encounter a wildlife spider than a wildlife snake in everyday life.
Various authors (e.g., Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Phelps et al., 
2006; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010) have proposed that accelerated 
response times to aversive or phobic stimuli are due to an activa-
tion of the limbic system, more precisely to attentional modulation 
induced by the amygdala. Specifically, the perception of emotionally 
significant stimuli is supposed to be enhanced by the deployment 
of initial attention to them, which in turn would lead to increases 
in performance (Anderson and Phelps, 2001). This hypothesis 
requires the amygdala to have extraordinary processing abilities, 
including the ability to classify objects, to outpace other cortical 
processing routes, and to modulate those processing routes before 
they finish processing the object. However, our data rule out that 
enhanced priming is caused by an emotional response in the ongo-
ing trial because spider-fearful and snake-fearful individuals were 
virtually identical in their reported fear levels but showed marked 
differences in their processing of phobic stimuli.
In our opinion, it seems more plausible to assume a processing 
advantage for phobic material due to life-long perceptual learning 
rather than an ultra-fast attentional modulation by the amygdala. 
VanRullen (2009) suggests the possibility of “hard-wired” binding 
4Note that the terms “lightness” and “brightness” have a well-defined meaning only 
for real-world objects; they are difficult to disentangle when pictorial stimuli are 
involved. See Schmidt et al. (2010) for a brief discussion.
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tern (Figure 6, lower panels). In the neutral condition, the stand-
ard response priming effect was observed in response times and 
error rates. In the enhancing condition, priming effects were much 
larger, which was also not surprising. But in the attenuation condi-
tion, priming effects unexpectedly reversed, such that responses in 
inconsistent trials became faster than those in consistent trials (a 
similar reversal occurred in the error rates). Together, the two tasks 
indicate that even though one flanker appeared brighter than the 
other in conscious vision, it primed responses as if it was darker 
(and vice versa). This constitutes a double dissociation between 
priming and awareness where an experimental manipulation leads 
to opposite effects on both measures (Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006).
How can this dissociation be explained? In an extensive follow-
up experiment, we showed that the priming effect strictly depends 
on the flankers’ local contrast values (Schmidt et al., 2010). In fact, 
the reversal occurs precisely in those conditions where the physically 
brighter flanker becomes a locally dark stimulus because it appears 
against a brighter background (and vice versa for the physically 
darker flanker). As long as the physically brighter flanker remains 
more luminant than the immediate background, it continues to 
activate responses as expected from a bright flanker. However, in 
the attenuation condition, the brighter flanker is darker than the 
immediate background, and so it activates responses as if it was 
dark (again, vice versa for the physically darker flanker). In other 
words, the sign switch in priming under attenuation conditions is 
due to a sign switch in local contrast. Brightness judgments in the 
matching task, even though strongly affected by the illusion, are 
robust against the switch in local contrast sign and thus dissociate 
from the priming effects.
These effects can be extended to transparency illusions (Weber 
and Schmidt, in preparation). Figure 7 shows examples where 
the central targets are flanked by stimuli that seem to be partly 
occluded by transparent surfaces. By varying the luminance and 
transparency of those occluders, conditions can be created where 
the flanker’s local contrast switches sign so that the physically 
brighter flanker becomes a locally dark stimulus (and vice versa). 
As soon as this happens (here, only in the “Attenuating 2” condi-
tion), priming effects switch sign as well; they remain regular in all 
the remaining conditions where the flankers’ local contrast signs 
remain unchanged (Figure 7, lower panels). At the same time, 
Figure 7 (upper panel) shows that in all conditions tested, includ-
ing the critical condition with reversed priming, the physically 
more luminant flanker is judged brighter than the less luminant 
flanker, establishing the double dissociation between priming and 
visual awareness.
This dissociation suggests that the two measures are based on 
qualitatively different stimulus representations: visual awareness 
makes use of a highly integrated three-dimensional reconstruction 
of the visual scene that achieves some degree of lightness/bright-
ness constancy, whereas the representation underlying rapid response 
activation uses more basic (or more primitive) information, only 
encoding local contrast values (for a similar but slightly more radi-
cal view involving response priming by color stimuli, see Breitmeyer 
et al., 2004a,b). Rapid-chase theory’s explanation of the  dissociation 
is that response priming is based on fast feedforward processing 
while lightness constancy requires more time-consuming  recurrent 
are subject to a visual illusion: if the bright flanker is placed on the 
lighted segment of the plane and the dark flanker on the shadow 
segment (attenuation condition), the flankers appear more similar 
than when placed on a neutral background. Conversely, if the bright 
flanker is placed on the shadow segment and the dark flanker on 
the lighted segment (enhancement conditions), the flankers appear 
more dissimilar than under neutral conditions (Figure 5A).
To compare the effects of this illusion on response priming 
and visual awareness, we designed two tasks. In the priming task, 
participants had to respond to the target patches presented in the 
mid-segment of the plane by pressing one of two response keys on 
the side where the brighter (more luminant) of the two targets was 
presented. This task was designed to measure rapid visuomotor 
priming effects from the flankers. In the matching task, we asked 
participants to adjust the luminance of the targets until their per-
ceived brightness matched that of the adjacent flankers. This task 
was designed to measure the illusion effect in visual awareness. 
Carefully note that participants matched the brightness, not the 
lightness of the flankers: they were not instructed to discard the 
effect of illuminance when matching the flankers, but to produce 
a match where targets and flankers looked equally bright.
As expected, the matching task confirmed the effect of the 
illusion (Figure 6, upper panel). In the enhancing condition, the 
bright flanker was judged too bright, and the dark flanker was 
judged too dark, while in the attenuating condition, the bright 
flanker was judged too dark, and the dark flanker was judged too 
bright. (Matching was nearly veridical in the neutral condition). 
Importantly, the more luminant flanker was always judged brighter 
than the less luminant flanker, and the illusion never led to a reversal 
of the perceived brightnesses.
 Figure 5 | Paradigm from Schmidt et al. (2010). (A) Stimulus examples. 
Note that target and flanker pairs have the exact same two luminance levels. 
(B) Time course of a trial. Note that all stimuli remain on screen until the 
response is complete.
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brightness of the adjacent flankers. Stippled lines denote veridical values. Lower panels: priming effects. Note the reversal in priming for response times and error 
rates under the attenuation condition.
  processing. Viewed this way, response priming provides a window 
into preconscious visual processing because it is driven by compara-
tively early output of the feedforward cascade. This might also hold 
for other fast reaction-time tasks, such as visual search (Treisman and 
Gelade, 1980). For instance, in a study by Moore and Brown (2001), 
visual search for high-luminance and low-luminance targets was 
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Binding problems arise at all stages of human perception – from 
the extraction of basic visual features to mid-level processes like 
figure–ground segregation and grouping, and finally to high-level 
object and scene perception. Different binding tasks are probably 
solved by different mechanisms: while contour assignment and 
visual search for conjunction targets might require extensive recur-
rent processing and selective attention (Roelfsema, 2006), basic 
object classification tasks might be based on feedforward processes 
converging on high-level object classifiers (Thorpe et al., 1996). 
Here, we advocate the idea that visuomotor measures of percep-
tion can give new insights into the temporal dynamics of visual 
performed under conditions in which parts of the display seemed 
to be viewed through a dark transparent filter. Because visual search 
was dominated by raw luminance rather than perceived lightness of 
the targets, the authors concluded that visual search had been initi-
ated before scene processing and lightness constancy were complete5.
 Figure 7 | Paradigm and results from Weber and Schmidt (in preparation). Conventions same as in Figure 6. Again, note the reversal in priming under the 
“Attenuation 2” condition.
5This conclusion might seem to conflict with evidence that subjective lightness is 
represented early in the processing hierarchy, e.g., in primary visual cortex or even 
the lateral geniculate nucleus (Rossi et al., 1996; Rossi and Paradiso, 1999; MacEvoy 
and Paradiso, 2001; for neural mechanisms of transparency processing, see Qiu and 
von der Heydt, 2007). However, those studies used a simultaneous contrast illusion, 
which is not well understood at present (Gilchrist, 2006), and the methods employed 
are not suited to distinguish between activation by feedforward or re-entrant signals.
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and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, 2009). Indeed, the most fascinating 
feature of response priming is its independence of visual awareness, 
as best shown by qualitatively different time courses of priming and 
masking (Mattler, 2003; Vorberg et al., 2003; Albrecht et al., 2010). 
In fact, rapid-chase theory predicts that response priming effects (at 
least, effects satisfying the rapid-chase criteria) are always based on 
preconscious processing, regardless of whether or how the stimuli 
are later represented in visual awareness. A case in point is the disso-
ciation between psychophysical judgments of flanker brightness and 
the associated priming effects induced by those flankers (Schmidt 
et al., 2010; Weber and Schmidt, in preparation). This is clearly an 
example of a double dissociation between response priming and 
visual awareness (Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006), but one that occurs 
despite the fact that all stimuli are clearly visible and remain on 
screen until the participant has responded. Therefore, the dissocia-
tion solely relies on the different time courses of rapid visuomotor 
activation (the results of first-pass processing) and visual awareness 
(the result of widespread recurrent processing).
The fundamental distinction between processing based on rapid 
feedforward cascades and processing based on elaborate recurrent 
mechanisms raises important new questions about the methodol-
ogy of behavioral neuroscience in general, especially when it comes 
to processes of human “mid-level vision” (Hegdé, 2008) like image 
segmentation, grouping, and binding. We propose that a funda-
mental distinction should be made between “slow psychophysics,” 
where participants report the final outcome of processing in visual 
awareness, and “fast psychophysics,” which are based on reaction-
time measures or other indicators of processing speed (Schmidt 
et al., 2010). Traditionally, both types of measures have been used 
to tackle similar problems, and are generally expected to lead to 
consistent results. Even though “slow” psychophysics has had great 
success in disentangling surprisingly early mechanisms of visual 
processing (in the case of color vision, right down to different lev-
els of retinal processing), one has to be aware of the fact that slow 
measures will often be remote from early processing. On occasion, 
fast psychophysical measures may contradict slow ones by being 
based on qualitatively different stimulus representations – e.g., the 
conscious perception of a stimulus measured by slow psychophys-
ics might be affected by masking or lightness constancy, while fast 
psychophysical measures like response priming may be unaffected 
by such factors. Being aware of potential differences between tradi-
tional slow psychophysics and fast motor measures of processing 
holds great promise for discovering qualitative differences between 
conscious and unconscious vision.
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processing, and can be employed to identify cases where visuo-
motor processing can plausibly be attributed to feedforward pro-
cessing. Most importantly, we maintain that visuomotor measures 
like response priming can be used to dissociate preconscious and 
conscious visual processing.
In assessing the dynamics of visuomotor processing, response 
priming effects can be employed in different ways, some more descrip-
tive, others more theoretically driven. These include the following 
uses: (1) employing priming effects as indicators that a feature can 
activate rapid responses; (2) comparing priming functions for dif-
ferent features or attentional states to assess their relative processing 
dynamics; (3) employing response priming as a measure of feedfor-
ward processing, using the rapid-chase criteria; (4) establishing quali-
tative dissociations between response priming and visual awareness.
Among those four uses of response priming, the first two are 
largely descriptive and assumption-free. Just establishing a large 
and rapid response priming effect for a given stimulus feature dem-
onstrates that this feature is able to activate fast motor responses. 
A next step is to compare two or more time courses of priming: 
for instance, priming functions can be used to demonstrate faster 
image processing in phobic images as compared to neutral images 
(Haberkamp et al., in preparation), or priming effects in pointing 
trajectories can be examined to compare different states of atten-
tion (Schmidt and Seydell, 2008; Schmidt and Schmidt, 2010). This 
way, the entire priming function can be regarded as a dependent 
measure for the processing dynamics of the system.
Beyond such descriptive uses, the paradigm becomes theo-
retically interesting under the assumption that response priming 
largely reflects the first output of a feedforward processing cascade. 
An essential requirement for this is to establish that response prim-
ing by a specific feature obeys the rapid-chase criteria (Schmidt 
et al., 2006). For example, we argued above that the classification 
of natural images into animals or non-animals meets the initia-
tion, takeover, and independence criteria of rapid-chase theory, as 
does the classification of simple geometric and color stimuli. In 
contrast to that, classification of objects as “large” or “small” fails 
those criteria (Schmidt and Schmidt, 2009). When the rapid-chase 
criteria are met, the system is behaviorally equivalent to a feedfor-
ward system where primes and targets control the motor response 
in strict sequence at high temporal resolution. It is a fascinating 
and useful working hypothesis to assume that a rapid-chase system 
in fact is a feedforward system whose initial motor output is still 
unaffected by recurrent processing. Such a system’s initial motor 
output would reflect the results of first-pass processing of primes and 
targets, i.e., the earliest output based on only a single feedforward 
sweep through the visuomotor system.
Viewing response priming effects as first-pass output of a feedfor-
ward system allows us to connect response priming to Lamme and 
Roelfsema’s (2000) proposal that visual awareness requires recurrent 
processing. If this is true, it implies that first-pass processing is pre-
conscious, in the sense that it precedes visual awareness (cf. Dehaene 
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